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The Law and the Little Big Horn:
What Beginning Law Students Can
Learn From General Custer
Samuel W. Calhoun
Most law students have heard of "Custer's Last Stand," in which General
George A. Custer' and a sizeable portion of the United States Seventh
Cavalry were killed by the Sioux Indians and their allies. Probably fewer
students know that since his death Custer has been the focal point of a
continuing controversy. Custer's mission, set out in a written order, was to
assist in forcing hostile Sioux, believed to be camped in the valley of the
Little Big Horn River, to move to the Sioux reservation. Some have argued
that Custer willfully disregarded the written instructions concerning his
approach to the valley, while others have said hat the order gave Custer
sufficient discretion to justify his actions. Evan S. Connell, in his recent
bestseller about Custer, writes that "[i]t is a matter of interpretation ... it
depends, like the blind man describing an elephant, on what part of the
creature you touch."'2 General Alfred Terry, Custer's commanding officer,
Samuel W. Calhoun is Associate Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University, School of
Law.
I wish to thank Dean Frederic Kirgis and Professor Mark Grunewald for their comments on an
earlier draft of this article. Professors Roger Groot and Andrew McThenia helped me to articu-
late the thoughts expressed in note 69. I also wish to thank the Frances Lewis Law Center for
sponsoring a faculty colloquium on this topic, which helped me to sharpen my analysis.
1. Custer's actual rank was lieutenant colonel, but it was customary to refer to officers by the
highest rank they had received. Custer in the Civil War had attained the temporary ranks of
both major general of volunteers and major general (by brevet) in the Regular Army. Robert
M. Utley, Custer Battlefield 9, Historical Handbook Series No. 1 (National Park Service,
1969). During that conflict, Custer earned the "reputation as the most daring, gallant,
courageous, and successful Union cavalry general." Stephen E. Ambrose, Crazy Horse and
Custer 181 (New York, 1975). Custer particularly distinguished himself during the final
campaign from Five Forks to Appomattox-so much so, that General Sheridan gave to
Custer's wife, Libbie, the table upon which Lee's surrender terms had been written. The gift
was accompanied by a note stating" 'that there is scarcely an individual in our service who
has contributed more to bring this about than your very gallant husband.' "Jay Monaghan,
Custer 246 (Lincoln, Neb., 1971).
While no one could question Custer's bravery in the Civil War, his tactics have been
questioned. One biographer states that "As a general, Custer had one basic instinct, to
charge the enemy wherever he might be, no matter how strong his position or number.., he
indulged that instinct whenever he faced opposition .. .Custer scorned maneuvering,
reconnaissance, and all other subtleties of warfare." Ambrose, supra. To take one example:
on the second day of the Battle of Gettysburg, Custer, without reconnaissance, attacked a
division with a squadron. The charge failed completely, but Custer was cited for gallantry.
Monaghan, supra at 140-41.
2. Evan S. Connell, Son of the Morning Star 260 (Berkeley, Calif., 1984).
@ 1986 by the Association of American Law Schools. Cite as 36 J. Legal Educ. 403 (1986).
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had no doubt: "[t]wo months after the battle [he] showed a Chicago Times
correspondent a copy of the orders he had given Custer and stated that if
Custer had lived he would have been court-martialed for disobedience."8
One of the skills most important to success in law school is the ability to
read critically. The premise of this paper is that immersion in the Custer
controversy can help beginning law students develop this skill. Recently, as
part of our first-year orientation program, I conducted an exercise to test this
premise. In the hope that it may be of interest, I present in Part I the
historical data that served as the raw material for the exercise. Part II then
analyzes the order to Custer, describing the ways in which I tried to direct
student discussion. I conclude in Part III with my thoughts as to the value of
the exercise as a law-teaching device.
Part I: Raw Material
The starting point is the order to Custer, which follows in full. I have
numbered the sentences to simplify discussion:
Camp at the Mouth of Rosebud River June 22, 1876
Lt. Col. Custer, 7th Cavalry:
Colonel:
(1) The Brigadier-General commanding directs that as soon as your regiment can be
made ready for the march, you proceed up the Rosebud in pursuit of the Indians whose
trail was discovered by Major Reno a few days ago. (2) It is, of course, impossible to give
you any definite instructions in regard to this movement, and were it not impossible to do
so, the Department commander places too much confidence in your zeal, energy and
ability to wish to impose upon you precise orders which might hamper your action when
nearly in contact with the enemy.
(3) He will, however, indicate to you his own views of what your action should be, and he
desires that you should conform to them unless you shall see sufficient reason for
departing from them. (4) He thinks that you should proceed up the Rosebud until you
ascertain definitely the direction in which the trail above spoken of leads. (5) Should it be
found, as it appears to be almost certain that it will be found, to turn toward the Little Big
Horn he thinks that you should still proceed southward, perhaps as far as the headwaters
of the Tongue, and then turn toward the Little Big Horn, feeling constantly however, to
your left so as to preclude the possibility of the escape of the Indians to the south or
southeast by passing around your left flank.
(6) The column of Col. Gibbon is now in motion for the mouth of the Big Horn. (7) As
soon as it reaches that point it will cross the Yellowstone and move up at least as far as the
forks of the Big and Little Big Horn. (8) Of course its future movements must be
controlled by circumstances as they may arise; but it is hoped that the Indians, if upon the
Little Big Horn, may be so nearly enclosed by the two columns that their escape will be
impossible.
(9) The Department Commander desires that on your way up the Rosebud you should
thoroughly examine the upper part of Tullocks Creek, and that you should endeavor to
send a scout through to Col. Gibbon's column with information of the result of your
examination. (10) The lower part of this creek will be examined by a detachment from
Col. Gibbon's command.
3. Id. For a fascinating fictional account of this trial, see Douglas C. Jones, The Court-Martial
of George Armstrong Custer (New York, 1977) (The verdict? Not guilty, but based not so
much on the merits as on the refusal of the Court, several of whose members had com-
manded the Union Army in major defeats during the Civil War, to convict a losing
commanding officer).
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(11) The supply steamer will be pushed up the Big Horn as far as the forks of the river are
found to be navigable for that space, and the Department Commander, who will accom-
pany the column of Col. Gibbon, desires you to report to him there not later than the





Acting Asst. Adjt. Genl.
4
Since it would be impossible for students to discuss whether Custer
disobeyed without knowing contextual facts, I also provided a brief written
chronology of events. To make sure that the students focused sufficiently on
the facts, I began the exercise by reviewing the chronology paragraph by
paragraph. I also supplemented the chronology at various points, after
telling the students that they should listen carefully, sine some of the addi-
tional information could be relevant to the issue of Custer's possible disobe-
dience. The written chronology and supplemental data follow, with the
chronology in twelve numbered paragraphs and the supplemental' informa-
tion inserted in lettered paragraphs at the appropriate spots.
(1) Late December, 1875: The Commissioner of Indian Affairs issued an
ultimatum to the Sioux to report to their reservations by January 31, 1876, or
be classified as hostile subject to military action.'
(a) As background for the ultimatum, I began by mentioning the Fort
Laramie Treaty of 1868, which ended the Red Cloud War.6 Under the Treaty,
roughly all of present-South Dakota west of the Missouri River was set aside
as the Great Sioux Reservation.7 The treaty also reserved the Powder River
country in parts of present Wyoming and Montana as " 'unceded Indian
territory' on which no white might trespass without Indian consent."8
Events soon were to disrupt the precarious peace based on the Treaty. In
the summer of 1873, surveyors for the Northern Pacific Railroad pushed
their way up the Yellowstone River Valley. While it is debatable whether this
4. Colonel W. A. Graham, The Story of the Little Big Horn 114-17 (1941). See the Appendix
for a map of the area referred to in the order. The map was reproduced from Edward S. &
Evelyn S. Luce, Custer Battlefield 7, Historical Handbook Series No. 1 (National Park
Service, 1952). The order both internally and when compared to another official document
from General Terry (see text accompanying note 40, infra,) contains several discrepancies in
capitalization and spelling. I have given the text exactly as it appears in the cited source.
5. Utley, supra note 1, at 14.
6. The Red Cloud War was fought by the Sioux chief of that name to cut off travel along the
Bozeman Trail to the gold fields in Montana Territory. It was a smashing success-for the
Sioux. Its most famous episode was the Fetterman Massacre of December 21, 1866, in which
a force of 80 led by Brevet-Colonel William J. Fetterman was annihilated. For a thorough
account of these events, see Dee Brown, Fort Phil Kearny (Lincoln, Neb., 1971).
7. Robert M. Utley, Frontier Regulars 135 (New York, 1973). See the map in the Appendix.
8. Id.
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projected route violated the 1868 Treaty,9 the Sioux reacted violently: there
were two sharp engagements with Custer's Seventh Cavalry, part of the
expedition assigned to guard the surveyors.' 0 Although Custer performed his
guard functions well, his relations with Colonel David Stanley, the expedi-
tion commander, were not particularly good. At one point, Stanley had
Custer placed under arrest for heading off with the Seventh Cavalry without
permission."
The Sioux were further angered in 1874 when Custer led an exploratory
expedition through the Black Hills, an area plainly within the Great Sioux
Reservation. Accompanying the expedition were two miners, who confirmed
the rumors of gold. News of this discovery predictably led to a gold rush.'
2
The government reacted "like a twin-headed dinosaur," attempting "to stop
miners from entering the Black Hills while at the same time following up
Custer's report" with the 1875 Jenny geological expedition. 13
If the Sioux had cause to be unhappy, so did the whites. Many Sioux,
rather than moving onto the Great Sioux Reservation, had remained in the
unceded Indian territory. Here they were the source of considerable trouble:
"They raided all around the perimeter of the unceded territory. They ter-
rorized friendly tribes. They contested the advance of the Northern Pacific
Railroad. They disrupted the management of the reservation Indians while
obtaining recruits, supplies, and munitions at the agencies for these hostile
activities."' 14 As a last straw, they also interfered with Government efforts to
purchase the Black Hills, which had become even more desirable after the
Jenny expedition corroborated Custer's report of gold. 15 "[M]ounting frus-
tration" from these difficulties led to the ultimatum referred to in paragraph
(1) of the written chronology.' 6 There was no "measurable response" to the
ultimatum.'
7
(2) February 1, 1876: The Secretary of Interior certified the Sioux as hostile
and asked the Secretary of War to take such measures as he thought
appropriate.
18
9. It is unclear whether the unceded Indian territory extended that far north. Id. at 242.
10. Id. at 242-43.
11. Monaghan, supra note 1, at 343. In fairness to Custer, it should be noted that Colonel
Stanley apparently was not the most amiable of men. Connell describes him as a "squat,
humorless, peevish alcoholic." Connell, supra note 2, at 234. In one example of that
apotheosis of detail which characterizes Connell's book, we are told that Stanley was irra-
tionally incensed by Custer's cast iron stove. Id. at 234-35.
12. Utley, supra note 7, at 243-45.
13. Connell, supra note 2, at 249.
14. Utley, supra note 7, at 246.
15. Id. at 245-46.
16. Id. at 246-47.
17. Id. at 248.
18. Utley, supra note 1, at 14.
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(3) April-May, 1876: A three-pronged expedition was begun against the
hostile Sioux.19
(b) The southern column of the converging movement, under General
Crook, was met by the Indians on the Rosebud on June 17, about twenty
miles from the site of Custer's battle on June 25.20 Although the hard-fought
battle was a stalemate, the result was that Crook turned back and was effec-
tively out of the campaign. Terry, Custer, and Gibbon were unaware of this
development.
21
The eastern column also warrants a word of elaboration. As originally
planned, Custer was to have been the field commander of this part of the
expedition. Custer, though, had the misfortune to become involved in
impeachment proceedings against Secretary of War Belknap. He offended
President Grant, who not only removed Custer from command but refused to
let him go with the expedition at all.22 Custer made "frantic efforts" to be
reinstated, and "through the kindly intercession of General Terry, the Presi-
dent at the last moment lifted the ban." 23 Custer could go, but only as leader
of the Seventh Cavalry; General Terry would command the expedition.24
(4) June 10-20, 1876: Major Reno, who accompanied the Terry-Custer
column, conducted a scouting expedition which discovered a large Sioux
trail heading south up the valley of the Rosebud.25
(c) Reno's orders had been to search the valleys of the Powder and Tongue
Rivers. Reno, however, abandoned his mission and moved westward to the
Rosebud, 26 where he followed the Sioux trail upstream.27 He reached his
farthest southern point on June 17, the same day that Crook was battling the
Sioux forty miles away.
28
(5) June 21, 1876: The overall commander, General Terry, held a conference
with Custer and Gibbon. Although there is no contemporary record of what
was said at this conference, General Terry later stated (with Gibbon's
concurrence) that it was determined that Gibbon would enter the Little Big
Horn Valley from the north, while Custer would enter the Valley from the
south; the plan was that no action would be precipitated before June 26, the
earliest day that Gibbon could reach the Little Big Horn.29
19. Id. at 17. The map in the Appendix illustrates this expedition.
20. Luce Se Luce, supra note 4, at 6.
21. Ambrose, supra note 1, at 390; Utley, supra note 7, at 255-56.
22. Graham, supra note 4, at 7-9.
23. Id. at 10.
24. Id.
25. Ambrose, supra note 1, at 386-87, 390-91; Utley, supra note 1, at 21.
26. Ambrose, supra note 1, at 386, 390. The explanation of why Reno did this is unclear. See
infra note 82.
27. Graham, supra note 4, at 12.
28. Utley, supra note 7, at 256.
29. See infra notes 63-72 and accompanying text.
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(6) June 22, 1876: The written order to Custer was issued; the Seventh
Cavalry departed at noon with rations for fifteen days.
30
(d) That evening, in camp twelve miles up the Rosebud, Custer told his
assembled officers "to husband their rations and the strength of the horses
and mules as he intended to follow the trail until the Indians were overtaken,
even if the trail led the troops to the Indian agencies on the Missouri or in
Nebraska."3 1
(7) June 23, 1876: Custer's column found the Sioux trail previously disco-
vered by Major Reno.32
(8) June 24, 1876: After a march of about thirty miles, Custer's column
camped at dusk. Shortly after 9 p.m., Custer was informed by his scouts that
the Sioux trail, which had grown larger and fresher all day, turned abruptly
to the right and went westward toward the Little Big Horn Valley. Custer
immediately roused his men and began a march along the trail. There was
considerable "whistling[and] hallooing" as the men tried to stay together in
the pitch darkness. By around 2 a.m., when a halt was called, the command
had proceeded approximately ten miles toward the Little Big Horn Valley.
Custer's plan was to rest the men on the 25th and make a dawn attack on the
26th. 3
(e) The point at which Custer left the Rosebud to turn west was only about
eight miles from the site of General Crook's battle a week earlier.3 4
(9) June 25, 1876, morning: Custer obtained information that his command
had been discovered by the Sioux. He decided not to wait until the 26th for
an attack, but to find the Sioux village and strike it as soon as possible.3'
(f) One piece of evidence that the column had been discovered was obtained
when some soldiers went back along the trail to recover a box of bread that
had fallen from one of the packs during the night march. The soldiers found
the box all right, but a small party of Indians was there first. The Indians,
upon seeing the soldiers, rode off toward the Little Big Horn Valley.3 6 Years
later it was learned that these Indians in fact did not reach the Sioux village
until after Custer had been killed.3 7
30. Utley, supra note 7, at 257-58.
31. Francis B. Taunton, Sufficient Reason? 29 (London, 1977).
32. Utley, supra note I, at 25.
33. Connell, supra note 2, at 268-69; Graham, supra note 4, at 15, 18-19; Utley, supra note 1, at
25.
34. Luce & Luce, supra note 4, at 10. Contra Ambrose, supra note 1, at 394 (sets the distance at
eighteen miles).
35. Graham, supra note 4, at 20-22.
36. Id. at 21-22.
37. Connell, supra note 2, at 271. At the time, of course, Custer had no way of knowing this.
Besides, there was other evidence that the column's presence had been communicated to tile
village. Graham, supra note 4, at 22. The more interesting question is whether the fact that
he had been discovered was the real reason for Custer's attack on the 25th. See infra notes
73-80 and accompanying text.
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(10) June 25, 1876, afternoon: Custer and five companies of the Seventh
Cavalry were killed.
38
(11) June 27, 1876: General Terry sent to General Sheridan a report of the
disaster, which referred to the conference of June 21, but made no mention of
a plan of cooperative action between Custer and Gibbon.39
(12) July 2, 1876: General Terry sent to General Sheridan a second report of
the disaster, marked "Confidential." It read in part as follows:
I think I owe it to myself to put you more fully in possession of the facts of the late
operations. While at the mouth of the Rosebud I submitted my plan to Genl. Gibbon and
to General Custer. They approved it heartily. It was that Custer with his whole regiment
should move up the Rosebud till he should meet a trail which Reno had discovered a few
days before but that he should not follow it directly to the Little Big Horn; that he should
send scouts over it and keep his main force further to the south so as to prevent the Indians
from slipping in between himself and the mountains. He was also to examine the head-
waters of Tullock's creek as he passed it and send me word of what he found there. A scout
was furnished him for the purpose of crossing the country to me. We calculated it would
take Gibbon's column until the twenty-sixth to reach the mouth of the Little Big Horn
and that the wide sweep which I had proposed Custer should make would require so much
time that Gibbon would be able to cooperate with him in attacking any Indians that
might be found on the stream.... The plan adopted was the only one that promised to
bring the Infantry into action and I desired to make sure of things by getting up every
available man.... The movements proposed for Genl. Gibbon's column were carried out
to the letter and had the attack been deferred until it was up I cannot doubt that we should
have been successful.... The proposed route [Custer's] was not taken but as soon as the
trail was struck it was followed. I cannot learn that any examination of Tullock's creek
was made. I do not tell you this to cast any reflection upon Custer. For whatever errors he
may have committed he has paid the penalty and you cannot regret his loss more than I
do, but I feel that our plan must- have been successful had it been carried out, and I desire
you to know the facts.... I send in another dispatch a copy of my written orders to Custer,
but these were supplemented by the distinct understanding that Gibbon could not get to
the Little Big Horn before the evening of the 26th.
40
(g) It is noteworthy that Terry's second message, although intended to be
confidential, actually was publicized as the first official news of the disaster.
Due to a communications foul-up, the second message was the first to reach
Sheridan, who was in Philadelphia attending the Centennial Exposition.
Sheridan showed it to Sherman, then in command of the Army, who was
also in Philadelphia. Sherman, desiring to rely the message to the Secretary
of War at once, entrusted it to a person whom he supposed to be a govern-
38. Seven of the Seventh Cavalry's twelve companies did not go to their deaths with Custer.
Shortly after noon on the 25th, Custer divided the Seventh into four parts: five companies
(approximately 215 men) for himself, three for Major Marcus Reno, three for Captain
Frederick Benteen and one to guard the pack train. Utley, supra note 1, at 28. Although
Custer's decision to divide his command is as controversial as his decision immediately to
follow the Sioux trail westward, that particular controversy is beyond the scope of this
paper.
39. Graham, supra note 4, at 109.
40. Id. at 110-14. When this document is compared to Terry's order to Custer, several discre-
pancies in capitalization and spelling appear. I have quoted the text exactly as it is given in
the cited source.
Jml. Leg.Ed. V.36 #3 Sept '86-5
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ment messenger but who was in fact a reporter for the Philadelphia Inquirer.
Terry's confidential message appeared in full in that paper on July 7, 1876.
41
Part H: Analysis
If the question is whether Custer disobeyed his orders, the students' task is
to determine what he was ordered to do, whether he carried out those orders,
and, if not, whether he was given sufficient discretion to justify his noncom-
pliance. One way to begin this inquiry is to have the students attempt to
characterize each of the eleven sentences in the document as either an "order"
sentence or a "discretion" sentence. While a few sentences do not fit either
category, the exercise is valuable in that it requires students to focus on each
sentence. The process should also reveal the difference in wording between
the various "order" sentences. Of the five sentences in this category, only
sentence one uses the peremptory word "directs." Sentences nine and eleven
use the softer word "desires," 42 while sentences four and five use the equally
indeterminate word, "thinks." A good question at this point is the signifi-
cance of the precatory language-did it convey the same latitude in this
military context that it would have in some other setting?43
41. Graham, supra note 4, at 110. Connell speculates that Terry's first report may have been
delayed because the telegraph operator in Bozeman, Montana Territory, celebrated the
Fourth of July too enthusiastically. Connell, supra note 2, at 273.
42. Sentence three also contains the word "desires" and thus might be considered an "order"
sentence. Since its thrust, however, is to give Custer discretion, I included it in that category.
43. It is no surprise that this question, like so many involving Custer, is marked by controversy.
Colonel Robert P. Hughes, who was General Terry's longtime aide-de-camp (and brother-
in-law), writes that "All military men know that the polite words 'he desires,' 'he thinks,'
have all the force that can be conveyed in the words 'he orders.' "Colonel Robert P. Hughes,
The Campaign Against The Sioux In 1876, 18 J. of Mil. Serv. Instit. of the U.S., No. 79, at
21 (1896), reprinted in the Appendix of Graham, supra note 4 (Graham refers to the Hughes
article as "the most complete and extended discussion" of Custer's possible disobedience
that Graham knows of; Graham, supra note 4, at 175). On the other hand, Captain Robert
G. Carter, another Indian War veteran, argues that such polite language rendered Terry's
document not a mandatory order at all but rather only a "very elastic" letter of instructions.
Colonel W. A. Graham, The Custer Myth 302-03 (1953).
I tend to side with Colonel Hughes, whose position is supported by those of my colleagues
with military experience. In addition, Francis B. Taunton, who for fifteen years studied the
issue of Custer's possible disobedience, concludes that Carter's argument is "irrelevant."
Taunton, supra note 31, at 3, 7374. He gives as authority the judge advocate general's
rejection of a similar defense in the court-martial of Colonel Joseph J. Reynolds, which
arose out of the engagement at Powder River on March 17, 1876. Reynolds, who was
convicted of conduct to the prejudice of good order and military discipline, argued that he
had received no orders, but that matters "had been left to his own discretion." Id. at 73. The
judge advocate general, commenting on the instructions to Reynolds, wrote that they
'were not in the form of positive formal orders, but they clearly and intelligently expressed
the wishes of the commander of the expedition.' "Id. at 74. For a thorough account of the
Powder River engagement and its aftermath, see Edgar I. Stewart, Custer's Luck 87-96
(Norman, Okla., 1983).
A discussion of how the meaning of words can vary with the context has an obvious
parallel in the trade usage concept so important in commercial law. It would therefore be
possible at this point in the exercise to introduce the "black-letter" law of trade usage. I
recommend against this. The exercise was designed to expose students to critical reading,
not specific legal concepts. Using it for the latter purpose (which is certainly tempting, as
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Assuming that Terry's44 use of "desires" and "thinks" did not deprive the
order of all compulsion, the next question is whether Custer did what he was
told to do. The directive in sentence one was speedily carried out,45 as was the
suggestion in sentence four.46 The contents of sentence five, however, were
disregarded by Custer, in that he immediately turned west to follow the
Sioux trail rather than proceeding southward up the Rosebud.47 Sentence
nine likewise was disregarded, 48 as was sentence eleven (although presum-
ably we will accept Custer's excuse for failure to report).
Even if Custer failed to comply with certain aspects of his orders, he
cannot rightly be accused of disobedience if he was given discretion broad
enough to justify noncompliance. Sentences two and three contain consider-
able discretionary language, and the heart of the exercise is to determine just
how much freedom of action they permitted.
49
On first impression, sentence two appears to have given Custer carte
blanche. Closer examination, however, reveals that its discretion-bestowing
power is quite limited. First, when one recalls how recently Custer had been
humiliated by President Grant,50 it can be argued that the language praising
entering students are usually anxious to hear "THE LAW"), could impair its effectiveness
for the former by bogging the group down in legal issues that the students are not prepared
to discuss.
44. Some students may have noticed that the order, although it states internally that it is being
given by the Department Commander (Terry), is not signed by General Terry. The explana-
tion lies in the standard military procedure of having written orders issued by a
commanding officer's adjutant general, who serves in effect as chief administrative officer.
45. See paragraph 6 of the written chronology, supra. "By noon the column was ready to be
reviewed, every man in his saddle, the pack train loaded. Promptness, action, no excuses.
Let's gol This was Custer at this best." Monaghan, supra note 1, at 376. As the troopers
passed before General Terry and Colonel Gibbon, Custer's "Ree scouts galloped back and
forth singing their death songs." Connell, supra note 2, at 259.
46. See paragraphs 7-8 of the written chronology, supra.
47. See paragraph 8 of the written chronology, supra.
48. See paragraph 12 of the written chronology, supra.
49. At least one Custer partisan was not content to rely upon the order's discretionary language
in attempting to prove that Terry had given Custer a free hand. The additional evidence was
the affidavit, dated January 16, 1878, of Mary Adams, Custer's cook. According to the
affidavit, Ms. Adams overheard a conversation in Custer's tent at the Rosebud River camp in
which Terry told Custer: "Use your own judgment and do what you think best if you strike
the trail." It has now been established that the affidavit is worthless. When news of the
disaster was conveyed to Mrs. Custer at Fort Lincoln on the morning of July 6, the person
who first appeared at her door was none other than Mary Adams, who allegedly had been in
Custer's ;ent two weeks earlier. For a full account of the Mary Adams affidavit, see Graham,
supra note 43, at 279-82; see also Graham, supra note 4, at 176-77. By the way, also present
when Mrs, Custer heard the news was Margaret Calhoun, Custer's sister, the wife of Lieut-
enant James Calhoun (no relation to the present writer), who died with Custer. It was a
particularly bad day for Margaret: she had lost not only her husband, but also three brothers
(Custer himself, plus his brothers Tom and Boston) and a nephew (Autie Reed). The
Soldiers 216-17 (Boston, Mass., 1973).
50. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
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Custer was chiefly a courtesy to soothe his ruffled feathers. 51 Second, the
reason for not imposing "precise orders" was that Custer not be hampered
"when nearly in contact with the enemy." A good case can be made that this
was not the condition on the night of June 24, when Custer roused his men
to follow the Sioux trail.52 Most probably, the phrase was used in reference to
battlefield tactics when a fight was imminent.53 Finally, sentence two is
overridden by sentence three. Beginning sentence three with "He will,
however. . .", in effect says "despite what I say in sentence two, you should
do what I say in sentence three." Sentence three told Custer that he should
conform to General Terry's views unless Custer saw "sufficient reason for
departing from them." Whether there was "sufficient reason" thus becomes
the dispositive issue.54
Probably the best case that a Custer apologist could make would be to
stress the order's obvious concern that the Sioux not escape.55 Although there
is no indication that the Sioux were aware of Custer's presence at the time he
made his June 24 decision to turn west toward the Little Big Horn, the Sioux
trail had grown fresher all that day.5 6 Custer may have thought that he was
so close behind the westward-moving Sioux that the chance of their escaping
to the south or southeast, the order's only explicit reason for telling Custer to
keep going southward even after the Sioux trail turned, was extremely
remote.5 7 Continuing to head south would thus have been pointless; even
worse, it might have given the Indians a chance to escape in some other
51. Utley, supra note 7, at 257. Custer in his last letter to his wife included the opening lines of
Terry's order, with the comment that he knew how much she appreciated "words of
commendation and confidence in [her] dear Bo." Monaghan, supra note 1, at 376.
52. It is true that the Sioux trail had grown "larger and fresher" all that day. Paragraph 8 of the
written chronology, supra. The evidence, however, is conclusive that at the time Custer did
not even know exactly where the Sioux were. Graham argues that as late as noon on the 25th
"no village had been definitely located; no force of Indians had [been] seen; and there
neither was nor could have been.., any definite plan, either of approach or of attack, in
Custer's mind." Graham, supra note 4, at 32.
53. See Hughes, supra note 43, at 28-30. But General Edward S. Godfrey, one of Custer's most
ardent defenders, argues that the phrase referred "to the immediate time and place of
writing the instructions, i.e.-the mouth of the Rosebud." Stewart, supra note 43, at 250 n.
48.
54. Since Custer apologists have been accused of skulduggery (see note 49, supra,) it is only fair
to recount a possible incidence of the same by a Custer critic. In 1892, General James S.
Brisbin printed Terry's order to Custer in an altered version that would have definitely
established Custer's disobedience (Custer was told not to depart from Terry's instructions
unless he saw "absolute necessity for doing so"). It has now been established that Brisbin's
version of the order was ina&urate. Graham, supra note 43, at 155-56; see also Monaghan,
supra note 1, at 408 and unnumbered note.
55. See sentences five and eight of Terry's order to Custer, supra. This concern reflected the
belief, common at the time, "that the Sioux would, upon the appearance of the troops,
hasten to strike their camp and escape. Nobody entertained the thought that they would
stand and fight a pitched battle." Graham, supra note 4, at 16-17. The Sioux's battle with
Crook had already shown this assumption to be erroneous, but Terry had no knowledge of
this development. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
56. See paragraph eight of the written chronology, supra.
57. This would be true only if Custer had the Sioux practically in sight. Otherwise, following
behind the Indians would have made it easier for them to slip around his left flank.
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direction. 8 The problem, of course, is that Terry had anticipated the Sioux
turn westward and had told Custer to keep going south regardless.5 9 It also
must have been anticipated that the fast-moving Seventh Cavalry would gain
on the Indians, who Reno's scout had shown to be traveling in large
numbers.60 Custer's immediate turn therefore arguably seems more the result
of unwillingness to carry out Terry's desires than justified noncompliance
based on conditions not contemplated when the order was issued.6' This
conclusion is virtually compelled by the evidence that Custer's intention not
to leave the trail was expressed prior to June 24.62
Another barrier to establishing "sufficient reason" for Custer's early west-
ward turn is the way such a move would frustrate the plan for coordination
with Gibbon's column. Terry contended after the disaster that another
reason that Custer was to have continued farther south before proceeding to
58. See Utley, supra note 1, at 26.
59. See sentence five of Terry's order to Custer, supra.
60. See paragraph 4 of the written chronology, supra. The grass along the Rosebud was "close-
cropped for miles around, indicating a huge pony herd." Ambrose, supra note 1, at 394. At
points the trail was "more than a mile wide, the earth so furrowed by thousands of travois
poles that it resembled a plowed field." Connell, supra note 2, at 267.
61. "Exactly what was found to be true, Terry had anticipated would be found to be truel and in
that event Custer was left in no doubt what Terry intended he should do, and with no
discretion to do otherwise than as ordered .. " Hughes, supra note 43, at 27. A possible
response for a Custer defender would be to stress that the order called for Custer to conform
to Terry's views "unless you [Custer] shall see sufficient reason for departing from them."
See sentence 3 of Terry's order to Custer, supra. This individualized wording arguably
committed the decision wholly to Custer's personal discretion: as long as he thought his
reasons for noncompliance were sufficient, it is immaterial that others might disagree. The
rejoinder is that all officers know that their decisions in the field are subject to review
against a standard of how similarly-situated professionals would have responded. For those
instructors inclined to expound upon the "subjective-objective" distinction present in
several substantive law areas, see my advice in the last paragraph of note 43.
62. See note 31 and accompanying text, supra. In addition to Custer's statement to his officers
on the evening of June 22, there are two other bits of evidence. First, on the evening of June
21, following the conference with Terry, Custer told his officers that the Seventh would
"'follow the trail for fifteen days unless we catch them before that time expires.' "Taunton,
supra note 31, at 25. Second, sometime on June 22, presumably before the Seventh marched
at noon, Custer filed his last dispatch to the New York Herald (yes, from the field Custer
submitted a stream of articles to keep the public informed of his exploits), stating that the
plan called for him to take up the trail " 'and follow the Indians as long and as far as horse
flesh and human endurance could carry his command.' "Id. at 24. Taunton concludes that
this evidence that Custer's decision to depart from Terry's instructions was premeditated,
reached "before he could have ascertained the situation and invoked the ["sufficient
reason"] clause giving him discretion," would have resulted in Custer's conviction had he
survived to face courtmartial. Id. at 78. One perceptive student has questioned this conclu-
sion with the argument that Custer's premeditation should not have convicted him if the
evidence showed that had Custer delayed his decision to the appropriate time, he would
have found sufficient reason for doing what he did. In other words, Custer's intent to depart
from Terry's views regardless of the presence or absence of sufficient reason would be
immaterial if sufficient reason in fact existed. I am not persuaded. The order permitted
noncompliance only if Custer, having "turned his mind" to the question, found sufficient
reason not to comply with Terry's views. A failure by Custer before acting to direct his
thoughts to this issue kould thus constitute disobedience, even if after the fact it could be
shown that sufficient reason existed. My colleague Roger Groot has given me a wonderfully
apt criminal law analogy for this mental state problem, but in view of the sentiments
expressed at the end of note 43, I will not tempt you with it.
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the Little Big Horn was that it would take Gibbon's slower-moving column,
which was part infantry, until the 26th to reach the Little Big Horn Valley. 63
Custer apologists have three responses to this charge. First, it is doubtful that
there was a plan for coordinated effort between Gibbon and Custer. Second,
even if such a plan existed, the June 22 order, by failing to mention the
significance of June 26, shows that the plan had been superseded. Third,
assuming that the plan did survive the order, Custer's June 24 turn westward
was consistent with an intent to comply.
Was there a plan for coordination between Custer and Gibbon? It can be
argued that Terry's delay in mentioning a plan until his second report of the
disaster on July 2 suggests that the idea was an afterthought to exculpate
himself.64 .It should be remembered, though, that the first report, which
failed to mention the plan, was intended to be made public, whereas the
second report was meant to be confidential. 65 This lends credence to the
argument of Terry's defenders that the discrepancy in the reports actually
resulted from an attempt by Terry to refrain from publicly assigning blame
to the fallen Custer.66 It is also noteworthy that Gibbon, who would not seem
to have had any particular reason for blaming Custer, corroborated Terry's
account of the existence and content of the plan.67 Finally, there appears to
be agreement among many historians that in fact there was a plan for coop-
eration between Custer and Gibbon calling for no attack by Custer prior to
June 26.68
Did the June 22 order supersede the plan calling for Custer to reach the
Little Big Horn no earlier than June 26? A good case can be made that if
June 26 remained a critical date as of June 22, it would have been explicitly
mentioned in the order. Terry arguably should have known that absolute
clarity was especially needed when dealing with Custer, who had shown a
63. Paragraph 12 of the written chronology, supra. See Connell, supra note 2, at 255-56; Utley,
supra note 7, at 257; Hughes, supra note 43, at 38-39.
64. See Comments by General J. B. Fry on Godfrey's Narrative (1892), reprinted in Graham,
supra note 43, at 151, 152.
65. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
66. Colonel Hughes contends that several of Terry's staff officers protested the exclusion from
the first report of "the fact that disobedience had occurred and had caused the miscarriage of
a well-considered plan that promised a great success." Hughes, supra note 43, at 18-19.
Terry, however, "would not give to the public the fact that Custer had flagrantly disobeyed,
but would rather himself 'bear an imputation hurtful to his military reputation.' " Id. at
19. Hughes also attempts to refute the "afterthought" theory by citing a June 21 letter from
Terry to his sisters, which explains his plan and closes with the remark, " 'I have
considerable hope that this combined movement may justify the expedition.' " Id. at 20.
67. Connell, supra note 2, at 255-56.
68. Id.; Graham, supra note 4, at 12-13; Utle4, supra note 7, at 257. There also may be direct
evidence from Custer himself that there was such a plan. See note 74 and accompanying
text, infra. It should be noted-hat there is an important distinction between this plan
restraining Custer from attacking before June 26, and a plan ordering Custer to attack on
June 26. The latter interpretation is inconsistent with sentence eleven of the order, which
authorizes Custer to delay his arrival on the Little Big Horn as late as the expiration of the
time period for which his troops were rationed (fifteen days: see paragraph 6 of the written
chronology, supra). See Stewart, supra note 43, at 250-51.
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penchant for unauthorized, independent action.69 Even though it perhaps
was a mistake to omit June 26 from the June 22 order, its omission does not
mean that the date was no longer important. Custer had, after all, been
specifically told of its significance only the night before. Moreover, the order
did refer to Terry's hope that the Indians, if upon the Little Big Horn, would
"be so nearly enclosed by the two columns that their escape [would] be
impossible." 70 No enclosure would have been possible until Gibbon was in a
69. Recall the incident with Colonel Stanley in 1873. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
In addition, twice on the march from Fort Lincoln Terry had "threatened Custer with arrest
for pacing ahead." Connell, supra note 2, at 260. See note 83, infra.
Terry's imprecision in the order has, on each occasion that I have conducted this exercise,
led some participants to wonder if Terry had been intentionally ambiguous. The suggested
motive has to do with the fact that there are different ways of waging war. One is to confine
war to an enemy's fighting force; another is to engage in total war, where all of the enemy's
people are considered a target. The possibility suggested is that Terry, desiring the latter,
was unwilling to accept responsibility for it. He therefore deliberately made the order
ambiguous, knowing that the effect would be to unleash the "mad-dog" Custer against the
Sioux-warriors, yes, but women and children too.
The chief weakness of this hypothesis is that total war against the Indians was accepted
military procedure in 1876. As early as October, 1868, General Sherman (who was general
in chief of the Army from 1869-83), wrote to Sheridan:
As brave men and as the soldiers of a government which has exhausted its peace efforts,
we, in the performance of a most unpleasant duty, accept the war begun by our
enemies, and hereby resolve to make its end final. If it results in the utter annihilation
of these Indians it is but the result of what they have been warned [of] again and again
... I will say nothing and do nothing to restrain our troops from doing what they deem
proper on the spot, and will allow no mere vague general charges of cruelty and
inhumanity to tie their hands, but will use all the powers confided to me to the end that
these Indians, the enemies of our race and of our civilization, shall not again be able to
begin and carry on their barbarous warfare on any kind of a pretext that they may
choose to allege.
Connell, supra note 2, at 180.
It would be inaccurate to interpret "utter annihilation" to mean genocide in the sense of
lining up noncombatants and shooting them down. See Ambrose, supra note 1, at 296-98.
What the words did imply, however, was a willingness to charge into an Indian village,
knowing full well that some women and children would be killed in the process. This is
precisely what happened in November, 1868, when Custer fought the Battle of the Washita
against the Cheyennes. While Eastern humanitarians castigated Custer (who, it should be
noted, returned with 53 captive women and children), Sheridan issued a general field order
praising him and the Seventh "in the most grandiose terms." Ambrose, id. at 294; Connell,
supra note 2, at 189; Utley, supra note 7, at 152.
While I suppose it is possible that Terry deliberately used ambiguity to escape future
censure by humanitarians for attacking a village, I doubt it. It is more likely that he was
seeking the favor of his chiefs, Sherman and Sheridan, by implementing a fairly standard
strategy. (Other attacks on villages include the Powder River engagement in March, 1876
[see supra note 43], and Mackenzie's attack on Dull Knife's Cheyennes in November, 1876
[see Connell, supra note 2, at 340].) That Terry's plan called for a village attack is shown by
a February, 1876, letter to Division Headquarters urging that his present number of soldiers
was insufficient: " 'if the Indians who pass the winter in the Yellowstone and Powder rivers
country should be found gathered in one camp, or in contiguous camps (and they usually
are so gathered) they could not be attacked by that number without great risk of defeat.'"
Hughes, supra note 43, at 15.
A discussion that touches on our nation's response to the Indians will no doubt evoke
many emotions. While the appropriateness of that response is an issue beyond the scope of
this exercise, it is relevant to explore how students' feelings on this matter color their
reading of the order to Custer.
70. Sentence eight of Terry's order to Custer, supra.
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position to close the northern end of the valley.7' Finally, as Custer's column
moved out at noon on the 22nd, Gibbon called to him, "Now, Custer, don't
be greedy, but wait for us." 72 Such a remark would have been nonsense had
the plan for cooperative action been abandoned.
Was Custer's June 24 turn westward consistent with an intent to comply
with the plan of cooperative action?73 The chief argument for Custer's intent
to comply is his professed intention to rest his men on the 25th and attack at
dawn on the 26th. 71 It was only when Custer learned that his column had
been discovered by the Sioux that he decided to attack on the 25th.75 There
are several difficulties with this theory. First, dawn of the 26th was earlier
than Gibbon's expected arrival in the Little Big Horn Valley, which the July
2 report refers to as the evening of that day. 76 Second, Custer made no effort
to communicate his early westward turn to Gibbon, who perhaps could have
arrived earlier had he been notified.77 Third, Custer's announced reason for
hurrying the attack seems somewhat suspect. If he was so afraid of discovery
by the Sioux, why was so much noise permitted on the June 24 night
march?78 In addition, why were the men allowed to build breakfast fires on
June 25? Custer's own scouts saw the smoke from ten miles away.
79
71. See Connell, supra note 2, at 256. The statement thus corroborates the existence of the plan
calling for no attack by Custer prior to June 26. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
72. Ambrose, supra note 1, at 393. Custer's response? " 'No, I will not.' " Id. at 394.
73. A Custer critic would find laughable the suggestion that Custer had ever intended to abide
by the plan. Not only did Custer's response to Gibbon's warning suggest as much (see supra
note 72 and accompanying text), but there was also an even earlier indication that Custer's
intent from the beginning had been to go it alone. On May 8, 1876, within minutes after
Custer had been informed by General Terry that he could accompany the expedition, Custer
told a fellow officer "that his purpose would be at the first chance in the campaign to 'cut
loose from (and make his operations independent of) General Terry during the summer';
that he had 'got away with Stanley and would be able to swing clear of Terry.' " Hughes,
supra note 43, at 14-15.
74. Paragraph 8 of the written chronology, supra. Ambrose, in describing the meeting in which
Custer communicated this plan to his officers, states that Custer told them "he would rest
the command through the day (June 25), then attack at dawn on June 26, the day Gibbon
was expected to arrive on the Little Bighorn." Ambrose, supra note 1, at 396. See Utley,
supra note 7, at 258. If this means that Custer actually mentioned Gibbon's expected
arrival, it is conclusive proof that there was indeed a plan of cooperative action and that
Custer knew of it.
75. Paragraph 9 of the written chronology, supra.
76. Paragraph 12 of the written chronology, supra; see Taunton, supra note 31, at
65-66. Gibbon's column in fact reached the Valley shortly after noon on the 26th. Connell,
supra note 2, at 1-2.
77. Hughes, supra note 43, at 28. Custer further revealed his lack of interest in cooperating with
Gibbon by his failure to examine Tullock's Creek and send him word of the results. Not
only had he been explicitly ordered to do this (with no escape clause), but a scout had been
furnished for this specific purpose. Sentence 9 of Terry's order to Custer, supra; paragraph
12 of the written chronology, supra. See Hughes, supra note 43, at 30-32.
78. Paragraph 8 of the written chronology, supra. See Connell, supra note 2, at 271.
79. Connell, supra note 2, at 269.
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The lack of new information supporting Custer's early turn westward and
the way the turn frustrated the plan of cooperative action strongly suggest
that there was no "sufficient reason" for this deviation from Terry's orders. 80
An argument might be made, however, that Custer had reason to believe,
apart from the language of the order, that Terry would not find official fault
with his decision immediately to follow the Sioux trail. Only a few days
before, Terry had taken no steps to discipline Major Reno, 81 who on his
scouting expedition arguably had disobeyed Terry's instructions in the same
way that Custer intended to do.82 The major problem with this defense is
that Custer's situation on June 24 was entirely different than Reno's some
days earlier. On the 24th, not only was everyone certain that the Sioux were
located on the Little Big Horn but a plan had been formulated for attacking
them there no earlier than the 26th. Under these circumstances, Custer could
80. This is my current view of the matter, despite the warning by Graham "that between wilful
disobedience of orders and justifiable disregard of instructions there yawns a gulf both wide
and deep" and that the "Commander on the scene is entitled to the benefit of every doubt, if
there be room for doubt." Graham, supra note 4, at 178. If my view is correct (and I must
say that in the past I have felt differently), the question becomes, why did Custer disobey?
This is a subject of endless fascination, and I can only list some of the theories:
(a) Custer and several of his officers wanted to finish with the Sioux quickly so that they
could attend the opening of the Philadelphia Centennial Exposition on July 4. Connell,
supra note 2, at 272.
(b) Custer was desperate for victory to protect his Army career. "Only a towering public
reputation can protect an officer from the sort of Presidential displeasure Custer had
provbked. Without some new military accompishment he was probably finished.... The
Soldiers, supra note 49, at 204. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
(c) Custer wanted to defeat the Sioux by himself because he was jockeying for the Presiden-
tial nomination of the Democrats, whose convention was about to open in St. Louis.
Ambrose, supra note 1, at 373, 396; Connell, supra note 2, at 272; Mari Sandoz, The Battle of
the Little Bighorn 230-31 (1966).
(d) Custer acted from his intense pride in the Seventh Cavalry and his conviction that it
alone could whip the Sioux. Connell, supra note 2, at 260; Stewart, supra note 43, at 267-68;
Utley, supra note 1, at 26. This characteristic helps explain Custer's rejection, with the
comment that the Seventh "could handle anything," of the offer of four companies of the
Second Cavalry just before his departure up the Rosebud. Connell, supra note 2, at 256-57.
See Ambrose, supra note 1, at 391-92; General Edward S. Godfrey, Custer's Last Battle
(1892), reprinted in Graham, supra note 43, at 125, 134.
(e) Custer acted consistently with his nature. He had never been a "soldier to march away
from the enemy's known position." Ambrose, supra note 1, at 396. "Every victory he had
ever won had come from plunging to the attack." The Soldiers, supra note 49, at 212. See
supra note 1. Colonel Gibbon later wrote, "'Poor fellow! Knowing what we do now, and
what an effect a fresh Indian trail seemed to have had upon him, perhaps we were expecting
too much to anticipate a forbearance on his part which would have rendered cooperation of
the two columns practicable.' "Hughes, supra note 43, at 32-33. See Stewart, supra note 43,
at 268; infra note 82.
81. Monaghan, supra note 1, at 372.
82. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text. Several writers state that Reno found a Sioux
trail on the Tongue and followed it to the Rosebud. Ambrose, supra note 1, at 390; Godfrey,
supra note 80, at 129-30; Monaghan, supra note 1, at 372-73. Others, however, state that
Reno found a trail for the first time after he had reached the Rosebud in defiance of orders.
Graham, supra note 4, at 11-12; Taunton, supra note 31, at 20; Utley, supra note 7, at
256. In any event, Reno had not been punished for pursuing the Indians contrary to orders.
See Taunton, supra note 31, at 86. It is somewhat prophetic that Custer was angry at
Reno-not for disobeying Terry, but for returning to camp: he could not "imagine how any
Indian fighter could leave a hot trail, and he chewed Reno out in no uncertain terms."
Ambrose, supra note 1, at 391.
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not have reasonably thought that Terry, in the absence of "sufficient reason"
for his turn westward, would have held him blameless.
83
Part : Evaluation
There are only two definite claims I can make for the exercise. First, it is
fun. Student interest is high and the discussion is spirited. Second, students
who hereafter visit the Custer Battlefield in Montana will have a special
appreciation of its history.
My more substantive claim is more tentative, but I am still willing to make
it: I believe the exercise gives students a chance to do instinctively what most
of us struggle to get them to do in our law classes-to grapple with the facts.
In the arguments for and against Custer, an instructor will be pleased at how
thoroughly the students grasp the facts presented and how astutely they
marshall those that support their point of view. Later on in the year, when a
student in contracts or torts seems adamant about a conclusion that has no
basis in factual analysis, a helpful corrective might be, "I am not really
asking you to do anything all that strange. Remember General Custer." This
parallel is especially effective because the types of facts generally relevant in
legal analysis-the words used, the context, prior and subsequent events-
are the same types of facts that were dealt with in analyzing Terry's order to
Custer.
8 4
I leave the reader with one word of caution. If you ever conduct this
exercise, you run a substantial risk that you and your students will become
forever ensnared, as many others have been, by the allure of what happened
on the banks of the Little Big Horn so long ago. With that thought in mind
(and borrowing from the dedication in W. A. Graham's fascinating book,
The Custer Myth,) I dedicate this article to all of you "with malice afore-
thought, express and implied.
'8 5
83. This difference in circumstances also distinguishes the events of the 24th from an incident
on the march from Fort Lincoln, when Custer had taken four companies on a 45-mile scout
without permission. Monaghan, supra note 1, at 372. Terry expressed his disapproval to his
diary, but apparently said nothing to Custer. Id. On othe" similar occasions, Terry had been
more vocal. See supra note 69.
84. There are other ways in which the exercise might prove useful. One is to have students make
a written argument for or against Custer in his hypothetical court-martial. See supra note 3
and accompanying text. To get the best feeling for a student's analytical abilities, this
should be done after the written chronology and supplemental data have been presented but
before group discussion. After discussion, the written arguments can be reviewed to point
out facts that have been omitted or poorly used. Another possibility is to have students
explore how changes in the language of the order could affect the analysis of Custer's
possible disobedience. Supra note 54, gives one example of such a change. Students might
also be asked to redraft the order to make it more clearly mandatory without tying Custer's
hands had circumstances proven radically different from the assumed facts.
85. Graham, supra note 43, at v.
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